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ABSTRACT – The article argues that the fate of democracy and the 
future of liberationist thought in Latin America are bound to a self-
understanding of the correlative concepts of race, ethnicity, and cultural 
identity. In order to recast a Latin American philosophy of liberation, 
we must revisit thus autochthonous accounts of Marxist analysis and 
critical theory in their very genesis and phenomenological production 
of meanings.
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ABSTRACT – O artigo argumenta que o destino da democracia e o 
futuro do pensamento liberacionista na América Latina dependem de 
uma autocompreensão dos conceitos correlativos de raça, etnicidade 
e identidade cultural. A fim de reformular o que seria uma filosofia 
latino-americana da libertação, é mister revisitar versões autóctones da 
análise marxista e da teoria crítica na sua própria gênese e produção 
fenomenológica de significados.
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I
Let me begin with a couple of quotes from European travelers in Latin 
America. The first one stems from a French traveler, Louis Agassiz, who 
went to Brazil in 1865 on a scientific expedition:
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Let any one who doubts the evil of this mixture of races, and is inclined, from 
a mistaken philanthropy, to break down all barriers between them, come to 
Brazil. He [sic] cannot deny the deterioration consequent upon an amalgation 
of races, more wide-spread than in any other country in the world, and which 
is rapidly effacing the best qualities of the white man, the Negro, and the 
Indian, leaving a mongrel nondescript type, deficient in physical and mental 
energy (apud SKIDMORE, 1974, p. 32).
The second quotation comes from Swedish travel writer Fredrika 
Bremer’s 1851 journal during her stay in Cuba:
“I am told here that nothing but severity will answer in the treatment of 
slaves; that they always must know that the whip is over them; that they 
are ungrateful people... It is amid circumstances such as these that one may 
become enamored of the ideal communities of socialism, and when men 
such as [Amos Bronson] Alcott seem like the saviors and high-priests of the 
earth... How beautiful appear to me associated brotherhoods on the earth, 
with all their extravagance of love, when compared with a social state in 
which human powers are so awfully abused, and human rights trampled 
under foot!” (apud HAHNER, 1998, p. 76f.)
The  contrasting  views  expressed  here  typically  highlight  the 
Eurocentric approach to the problem of the Latin American Other, either 
to depreciate the Native, indigeneous peoples, enslaved Africans, and 
mixed-race inhabitants of the subcontinent or to thematize the Other of 
imperial domination and colonial conquests. Hence, like Maria Graham, 
Flora Tristan, and other European women who traveled to Latin America 
in the 19th century, Bremer succeeds in critically overcoming what 
Mary Louise Pratt has dubbed the “imperial eyes” model and its self-
other dichotomies, as their travel writings unveil an interesting cross-
fertilization of class, race, and gender perspectives, paving the way for 
transculturation, hybrid cultures, and the hopes for egalitarianism, mutual 
recognition, and the celebration of diversity in the very search for cultural 
identity (PRATT, 1992).
A Latin American phenomenology of liberation will seek precisely to 
rescue these race-gender correlates which were somewhat neglected or 
downplayed by the original, first-generation writings on liberation, so 
as to pave the way for the future of liberation and deliver its promises 
of emancipatory democracy. While critical race theory started from 
a critique of liberalism (DELGADO and STEFANCIC, 2000), its US 
American-oriented analyses have inevitably been also targeted by 
Latin American liberationist thinkers, even as they tend to get closer 
to a critical-theoretical account of liberation. In this sense, critical 
race theory stands somewhat closer to critical legal studies than to 
liberationist approaches to critical theory in Latin America, in spite of N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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the Marxian-inspired class reductionisms that tend to eclipse race and 
gender conflicts in the latter (UNGER, 1986). In this brief paper, I am 
not as much interested in revisiting the archeology of race theories in 
Latin America as calling into question some North Atlantic, paternalist 
approaches to Latino and Hispanic identity overall and the rendering of 
Latin American philosophy as just another Department of State scholarly 
accomplishment. After all, as Gracia remarked, “Latinos and non-Latinos 
belong to different social groups, but these groups are not homogeneous 
and should not be regarded as foreign to each other,” insofar as “they 
are not like nations” (GRACIA, 2008, p. 210). Therefore, in this paper I am 
rather focusing on the Latin American recasting of a critical-theoretical 
account of liberation that takes the phenomenology of  sociality and the 
social phenomena of racism, racialization, and race relations seriously. 
Even though Latin American Liberation Philosophy has systematically 
dealt with the question of the Other from its beginnings in the 1970s, 
the preferential option for the poor and the Marxist analysis employed 
by liberation theologians and philosophers in the 1960s throughout the 
70s and 80s tended to eclipse gender, racial, ethnic, and environmental 
issues, which only came to the fore in the 90s and in this new century. 
Witness the developments of public discussions and debates on the 
scope of liberationist thought which have been taking place in different 
editions of the World Social Forum from 2001 through 2010. The shift 
from economic determinism towards cultural, social, and ecological 
analyses that take into account problems of race, ethnicity, gender, 
environment, and sustainability broadly construed characterizes the kind 
of phenomenological, perspectival approach to Latin American philosophy 
that I am proposing here. I am thus dividing my brief presentation on 
Latin American Philosophy in three main axes, namely, Philosophy of 
Race, Liberation Philosophy, and Critical Theory. Let me formulate, 
from the outset, the guiding thesis of this essay: the fate of democracy 
and the future of liberation in Latin America are bound to our own self-
understanding of the correlative concepts of race, ethnicity, and cultural 
identity – and as much could be said of the gender and environmental 
correlated conceptions. This is both an empirical, historical constatation 
and a normative statement, and even though I cannot elaborate on this 
thesis here, I am assuming that a social, phenomenological perspectivism 
succeeds in reconciling cultural relativism with both normative and 
agonistic accounts of morality, analogous to the approach suggested 
by Alcoff’s “Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment” (BERNASCONI, 
2001, p. 267-283). Furthermore, I only emphasize the first person plural 
in order to stress the Latin American perspective we are speaking from, 
as opposed to a supposedly neutral, universalistic standpoint often N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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adopted by philosophers when dealing with race problems in American 
and European societies. Even as we realize that “democracy”, “race”, 
and “Latin America” are themselves European inventions, one cannot 
talk about “race” without a systematic hermeneutics of suspicion 
toward its Eurocentric origins, interests, and ends (BERNASCONI 
and LOTT, 2000). In phenomenological terms, both the arché and the 
telos of any theory of race translate and betray geopolitical, economic 
strategies of domination. From the very start, I am thus fully endorsing 
the premise that no account of race can be dissociated from a critique of 
power and a social, historical ontology of ourselves. This simply means 
that a Latin American philosophy of race is inevitably bound to both 
politics and social psychology, or, in Foucauldian terms, to power and 
subjectivation. It is my contention here that a Latin American account 
of race and racial relations must go beyond the dialogues de sourds 
between modernists and postmodernists and the ongoing debates 
between liberal, republican, procedural, and communitarian accounts 
of democracy and self-other relations. My working hypothesis is that 
the social, political gaps that one finds in most otherwise interesting 
proposals can be filled in by a phenomenology of liberation that takes both 
a philosophy of race and critical theory into account. What I have dubbed 
elsewhere the phenomenological deficit of critical theory allows thus for 
a phenomenological recasting of a philosophy of liberation, precisely at 
the level of a weak social constructionism that mitigates and mediates 
some of the too-strong, objectivist claims of Marxism in liberation 
philosophy and some of the too-weak, subjectivist “representations” of 
postcolonial and cultural studies. In this sense, the future of liberation 
philosophy in Latin America hinges upon the very fate of democracy, 
itself bound to the ups and downs of globalized capitalism in developing 
societies. Insofar as there is no ontological commitment to an essentialist 
universalism in globalization, liberation, ethnic studies or world ethics 
(Weltethos), I prefer to think here of a pragmatic perspectivism in 
semantic, phenomenological terms.
II
Even though one might be careful enough to avoid any dogmatic 
definition of race and ethnicity, I must confess in a straightforward 
gesture that I am adopting a weak social constructionist version that 
fits quite well into social scientists and historians’ approaches to Latin 
American identity and culture. As George Reid Andrews put it bluntly, 
“race is not a scientific fact but a social, cultural, and ideological 
construction” (ANDREWS, 2004, p. 6). Of course, from a philosophical N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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standpoint, it would be, however, too simplistic to simply eliminate 
“race” from any scientific talk about natural history, social evolution, and 
ethnology. This is neither meant to simply discard whatever importance 
biological, genetic variables might have for some scientific analyses 
nor to merely equate race and ethnicity, but within the perspective of a 
social philosophy, I am committed here to a weak social constructionist 
that reflects a pragmatic, phenomenological perspectivism. I believe 
that a Latin American philosophy of race aims at both deconstructing 
racial democracy myths (which is in itself a deconstruction of scientific, 
historical conceptions of race) and liberating narratives (deconstruction 
of Eurocentric myths of liberation, including democracy, liberalism, and 
socialism), without being reduced to any aristocratic, libertarian or 
nihilistic view. In this sense, I think liberation philosophy recasts Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Foucault’s hermeneutics of suspicion in normative-
agonistic terms that take into account the mixed blessings of critical 
theory both in the agonistic, negative dialectics of first-generation 
exponents (Benjamin, Adorno, Horkheimer, Bloch, Marcuse) and in the 
normative claims of social philophers of the second and third generations 
(Habermas, Honneth).
I think that Andrews has correctly understood the peculiar, paradoxical 
contribution of the Latin American ethnic, racial makeup in terms of the 
idea of mixed race and miscegenation, which has been evoked not only 
by European travellers but also by the very proponents of a certain 
Latin American identity. If Bartolomé de las Casas, often regarded 
as the patron saint of liberation, exemplifies the universalistic strain 
within the synthetic paradigm of race, and José Martí the particularistic, 
revolutionary one, José Vasconcelos combines these approaches in his 
utopian project of a cosmic race. Even if we don’t regard “utopian” as 
“Romantic” in a pejorative sense, I agree with Carlos Fuentes’s critical 
take on Latin American, self-deceptive racial myths, epitomized by 
José Enrique Rodó’s Ariel: there is indeed a tendency towards reverse 
prejudice, either to demonize Anglo-American or to romanticize Iberian-
Latin influences. The myth of racial democracy can be thus evoked here in 
order to make sense of mestizaje (racial mixing)1 and the deconstruction 
of purity, as there is obviously no such a thing as a pure mestizo. Among 
Latin American social pathologies relating to myths of racial purity, the 
most intringuing ones were the whitening and browning that reflect 
Latin American self-understandings of their own identity and difference   
 
1  I am using the term “mestizaje” (Portuguese, mestiçagem; French, métissage) to 
allude to all possible mixed-racial combinations so as to comprise not only European 
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problems. Still, we must grant that both Las Casas and Martí engaged 
in moral projects that were ultimately political and emancipatory. As 
Vacano pointed out, “the belief that beneath apparently accidental and 
superficial dissimilarities lies a basic human sameness that although 
it may lie dormant must be made explicit, is a particularly Latin 
American conception of race” (GRACIA, 2007, p. 2). It is also a notion 
that borders on the concept of a people or ethnicity: for Martí a race is 
not only defined by its phenomenal characteristics, but by its cultural, 
historical life. Therefore, the essence or what others might call the 
universal substance or underlying set of properties is the same for 
all races, if one thinks of the “human race” broadly construed. Martí 
does not elaborate on this point, but it seems that a spiritual and 
moral desire to be free is what is common to all men. We can easily 
infer that most Latin American accounts of race ultimately refer to a 
philosophical anthropology and humanist conceptions. The dramatic 
and traumatic encounter of Iberian and other European colonizers and 
travelers with Native, indigenous peoples and enslaved Africans in 
Latin America was not only decisive for the emergence of  racially mixed 
identities but also for the spectacularization of tropical, anthropofagic 
subcultures and the consolidation of a self-identity of exotic cannibalism. 
I agree thus with Velazco y Trianosky in that “to be a mestizo [in Latin 
America] is clearly not to begin from the experience of racelessness. In 
this respect the Latin American struggle to liberate oneself and one’s 
community through the subversive reinterpretation of mestizo identity 
is much more akin to the struggles of African Americans than it is to 
the in-between experience faced by Hispanic immigrants to the United 
States” (VELAZCO Y TRIANOSKY, 2010, p. 295). Furthermore, a Latin 
American philosophy of race challenges the hyphenated-American and 
typically state-regulated immigration-oriented conceptions of racial 
policies meant to reflect and determine imaginable identities (CORLETT, 
2003, p. 72f).
Because of variously conceiving of a pure race or pure conceptions 
of race, racism will inevitable arise. Hence, the deconstructing motif 
of mestizaje or mixed race proves to be a quite pervasive one as a 
countermovement, as it were, to inevitable surges of racism. In effect, 
most Latin American philosophers would agree that Latin American 
identity seems to favor such a privileged conception of mixed races 
through the very contingencies that led to the development of mestizos, 
mulattos, morenos, pardos, zambos and all kinds of mixed-racial 
combinations in the subcontinent. In this sense, Linda Alcoff has rightly 
attacked Samuel Huntington’s controversial remarks about Hispanics 
and Latin American immigrants having to become like Anglo-Americans N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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in order to accomplish the American Dream.2 As Stephen Satris also 
denounced, racial supremacy unveils the white qua pure as opposed 
to the colored other (ZACK, 1993, p. 54). After all, the Other will always 
be a threat whenever one takes ethnic identity as an exclusivist view 
of homogeneous, fixed cultural traits or ritual features such as religious, 
customs, daily practices. In effect, if there is anything universal –not 
necessarily eligible for a Kantian ideal of universality – it is racism 
or racist conceptions of race, regardless of scientific and ideological 
justifications (BERNASCONI, 2001, p. 12ff). The Rawlsian distinction 
between concepts and conceptions (to oppose his own conception of 
justice as fairness to competing concepts of justice, such as folk concepts 
of a sense of justice and theoretical accounts) has recently been evoked 
by Joshua Glasgow’s A Theory of Race (2009), which sought to recast 
the normative grounds of the semantic-ontological problem of race, by 
propounding Racial Reconstructionism as a third-way substitutionism 
between the Anti-Realism of eliminativist conceptions of race (i.e. that 
we should eliminate race-thinking entirely, e.g. Appiah, Blum, Corlett, 
Zack) and the Realism of anti-eliminativists who advocate some form of 
Racial Conservationism (Du Bois, Outlaw, Sundstrom, Taylor). According 
to Glasgow, “the race debate is about whether to eliminate or conserve 
contemporary, public, folk racial discourse”. In order to make sense of 
folk concepts of race, however, specialists in racial theory tend to rely 
on what historical experts mean by “race”(GLASGOW, 2009, p. 42). In 
order to avoid normative and empirical gaps between the thick semantics 
of scientific, biological accounts and the thin conceptions of social 
constructionists, Glasgow resorts to a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium that 
seeks to strike a normative balance between our theoretical, categorical, 
and possible case intuitions to warrant modifications in our theories (for 
example, when evident mixed-race identities push us to eliminate the 
one-drop rule), and vice-versa, as our policies and practices are affected 
by our theoretical conceptions. Even though I find Glasgow’s proposal 
of a Folk Empirical Theory highly original and seducing, I believe that its 
semantic indeterminacy of race leaves much to be desired. Even if one 
grants that it is not a matter of simply replacing one term with another, 
say, politically correct, in order to denounce racial slurs and various 
forms of racism, there remains the semantic-ontological problem of the 
social interactions and use of language in intersubjective, everyday   
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practices, dealings, and communication – what has been identified, 
since Husserl and Schutz, with the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and practical 
interplays of the familiar and the strange (Heimwelt and Fremdwelt) 
in a phenomenology of sociality, thoroughly cultural and historical 
(STEINBOCK, 1996, p. 198). It seems that a crucial social, phenomenological 
deficit betrays thus the normative gap between Glasgow’s articulation 
of ontology and semantics – to my mind, a frequent blind spot in many 
analytic accounts. Whether racial terms purport to refer to natural or 
social kinds, so that the ontological is said to be prior to the normative, 
whether the semantic is manifest prior to the ontological and our task 
mainly consists in establishing normativity and finding an adequate 
ontological and semantic framework, so as to eliminate biological 
pretensions and semantic distortions, we still have to face the social 
reality of racism. It seems, instead, that racism must be tackled from the 
three fronts at once: ontological, intersubjective, and semantic-linguistic. 
This is precisely what I have dubbed a phenomenological correlation that 
takes the three perspectives as conceptual framework references to map 
and address the question, which Glasgow has correctly raised: what do 
we mean by race today? As it could be argued in terms of a philosophy 
of liberation, we cannot simply discard historical, empirical conceptions 
of race, however wrong and misleading they were, precisely because 
of our commitment to moral normativity. In my own understanding of 
human reality, history has taught us both particularism and universalism, 
both cultural relativism and moral normativism. History does teach us 
some great, valuable things, of truly moral value, but, echoeing Arnold 
Toynbee’s dictum, we are bad students of history. In order to reread 
the making of Latin American identities from history’s underside, we 
must revalue all values, as it were, precisely because no value was 
positively given in the first place (ALCOFF and MENDIETA, 2003,   
p. 407 ff.). No one in her sound mind dares to call into question today 
the moral evils of racism as historically recorded in genocides, slavery, 
ethnic persecutions, and monstruous events such as European pogroms 
and the Holocaust (Shoah). One cannot fix the moral errors of the past but 
we all (Latin Americans, Americans, Asians, Africans, and Europeans 
alike) can responsibly avoid repeating the same historical, moral errors. 
This certainly hinges upon a moral view of the world, as Nietzsche 
suspected, but this poses no problem, as I am assuming that moral 
realism, in the least analysis, cannot be sustained: there are no moral 
facts, only moral interpretations. Anti-realism in ethics and political 
philosophy can be thus said to be correlated to the historical realism of 
events and social institutions. Mutatis mutandis, a weak version of social 
constructionism is anti-realist to the extent that it refuses universalism, N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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it resists essentialism, and it refers back to the empirical realism of 
particular, historical facts and social ontology. To quote Naomi Zack’s 
take against biological racism, “there are no scientific facts about race 
that support the ordinary concept of race. There are historical facts about 
‘race’ as a social concept” (ZACK, 1993, p. 10).
III
As pointed out in the first part of my paper, folk conceptions of race 
– in Latin America, in the US and elsewhere – assume, in our common 
lifeworlds, that there are whites, blacks, Asians, and indigenous peoples 
(usually identified as Indians, Native Americans or Amerindians, in Latin 
America). Grosso modo, geographical, historical, and cultural (especially, 
ethnic and linguistic) features would be decisive here. Color perceptions 
might vary, but color does play a decisive role – especially in Latin America 
– and it has often been more associated with biological as opposed to 
social, ethnic features. Hence, gradual variations in things like skin color, 
hair texture, or bone structure, although not allowing for a neat distinction 
of human races, seem to refer to something real or natural (biological 
features, such as dark vs. light skin) as opposed to racial prejudice, 
discrimination, racism, which betray the social construction of racial 
concepts and are also to be found in self-identity and self-understandings 
of race, such as in US-American and Latin American conceptions. 
By stressing the paradoxical self-perceptions of mestizaje and racial 
ideologies of whitening and browning in Latin America, I think that we 
can now better understand my strategy in recasting a deconstructing 
view of liberation philosophy. It is generally assumed that the philosophy 
of liberation emerged with the publication of five volumes on the ethics 
of Latin American liberation, written by Enrique Dussel between 1970 
and 1975 (Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana). According 
to Dussel, we can divide the historical conception and developments 
of Liberation Philosophy in four main periods, following the European 
invasion of the 16th century (DUSSEL, 1996, p. 2):
1.  The  critique  of  the  conquest  (1510-53):  “implicit”  Liberation 
Philosophy
2.  The philosophical justification of the first emancipation (1750-1830)
3.  The “third Liberation Philosophy being articulated now” (since 1969)
3a. Antecedents: José Carlos Mariátegui, the Cuban Revolution of 1959.
3b. First explicit phase: from 1969 to 1973 (“stage of constitution”)
3c. Second phase: from 1973 to 1976 (“the stage of maturation”)
3d. Third stage: from 1976 to 1983 (“the stage of persecution, debate, 
confrontation”)N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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4d. Fourth stage: “up to the the present... the stage of growth and 
response to new problematics” – where Mendieta, Alcoff and others 
have situated the political-philosophical problem of liberation vis à vis 
critical theory (ALCOFF and MENDIETA, 2000; MENDIETA, 2003a). 
My own self-understanding and critical appropriation of liberation 
philosophy is to be situated right here, at the intersection of Latin 
American liberation with the semantic, pragmatic transformations of 
Critical Theory from its first utopian, negative critique of technological, 
capitalist domination towards the theory of communicative action and 
recognition to be found in Habermas and Honneth. In effect, to the 
extent that it systematically seeks “to liberate human beings from 
the circumstances that enslave them” (HORKHEIMER, 1982, p. 244), 
the  social  philosophy  of  praxis  associated  with  the  Frankfurt 
School, known as Critical Theory (Kritische Theorie), as opposed 
to “traditional” theory, can be fairly characterized as a liberationist 
critique  of  totalitarianism  and  late  capitalism’s  structures  of 
oppression and social pathologies. It is no wonder that several 
thinkers relating to the Frankfurt School, such as Benjamin, Bloch, 
Fromm, and Marcuse, exerted indeed a decisive influence upon Latin 
American liberation theologians in their struggles for recognition amid 
military dictatorships and authoritarian violation of human rights in 
the 60s, 70s and 80s. The arduous paths leading from authoritarian 
to democratizing lifeworlds in Latin America attest to the normative 
thrust implicit in the so-called “transition to democracy,” whose 
structural transformation properly deserves to be described and 
understood in critical-theoretical terms as an alternative to both 
revolutionary and reformist models. On the other hand, as Bresser-
Pereira has argued, it remains to be shown, elsewhere but particularly 
in Latin America, how one can get actual democratic institutions, 
an egalitarian political culture and a democratic ethos without 
presupposing a capitalist, bourgeois revolutionary process (just like 
the English, American, and French revolutions led to the establishment 
of economic and political liberalism in these countries). (BRESSER-
PEREIRA, 2009) That being said, the so-called Marxist analysis 
used by liberation theologians and philosophers must be critically 
reexamined, beyond the facile polarizations of Cold War ideologies. 
In effect, the grassroots movements associated with third-world 
struggles for liberation transcended theological circles and Latin 
American territories, as attest the educational, social, and political 
activism led by Paulo Freire, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Frantz 
Fanon, and then metal worker leader Lula da Silva (Brazil’s current 
president). The liberationist appropriation of Frankfurt thought is N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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quite problematic, to say the least, and the equation of the theological 
movement with a supposedly relevant “philosophy of liberation” is, 
to my mind, as misleading and problematic as the idea of a Christian 
philosophy. Nevertheless, some of the first-generation liberation 
theologians were also trained as philosophers and did write and 
publish seminal works on a certain philosophy of liberation. Enrique 
Dussel, Ignacio Ellacuría, and Juan Carlos Scannone were among 
the most important representatives of such a constellation. Other 
thinkers, such as Leopoldo Zea, Augusto Salazar Bondy, Arturo Roig, 
and Horacio Cerutti could be also mentioned, but I am particularly 
interested in Ofelia Schutte’s contributions to an ongoing intercultural, 
interdisciplinary conception of liberation philosophy, which tends to 
depart from Dussel’s post-Heideggerian, Levinasian reformulation 
of a Marxist ethics of liberation and takes into account recent 
developments in Latin American philosophy of race and ethnicity, 
esp. in light of the contributions by Linda Martín Alcoff and Jorge 
Gracia. I am deliberately leaving Eduardo Mendieta as I tend to side 
with him in my critical-theoretical approach to the phenomenology 
of liberation (MENDIETA, 2003b).
From a Latin American liberationist perspective, we must inevitably 
start from a given historical, social condition of oppression, colonization, 
and domination. The social ontology at issue, as Dussel reminds us, is 
to be thought, as it were, in der Praxis, both in its material, economic 
conditions and in its historical, existential openness toward social 
transformation, as already thematized by Marcuse’s utopian project of 
liberation, successfully combining a Hegelian reading of Marx with a post-
Heideggerian reading of alterity (esp. Levinas and Sartre). “Liberation”, 
as Dussel and the earlier liberation thinkers pointed out, emerges 
first of all as a radical hermeneutic, semantic turning-point within the 
Latin American social reality that drastically changed after the Cuban 
Revolution on January 1, 1959. In order to counter communism, there 
were military coups all over the subcontinent, with a little help from the 
CIA and US national security ideologies. In fact, many of the greatest 
phenomenologists in Latin America were forced into exile because 
of military regimes that took power in Argentina (1962-1963, 1966-
1973, 1976-1983), Brazil (1964-1985), Chile (1973-1990), and Uruguay 
(1973-1985). The most important cultural movement in Latin America 
in the second half of last century was thus closely tied to peasants 
and grassroots, social movements which sought to resist military 
authoritarianism. Many Continental thinkers related to phenomenology 
(such as Sartre, Levinas, Ricoeur, and Foucault) or to the Frankfurt 
School (Benjamin, Bloch, Marcuse, Apel, Habermas) were then evoked N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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by liberation thinkers in the 60s, 70s, and 80s (Alves, Gutiérrez, Boff, 
Dussel). It is very interesting to recall that Foucault’s lectures on biopower 
and biopolitics in the 1970s were then articulated (some of them, for the 
first time, in several talks he gave in Latin America), as he attempted to 
investigate how racial struggles, race wars, and racial discourses were 
used by governmental institutions to manage entire populations as 
another systemic form of normalization. Even though Dussel mentions 
some of Foucault’s archeological and genealogical contributions to critical 
analyses in Latin American struggles for liberation, he seems to dismiss 
them, together with Habermas’s critique of ideology, as still belonging 
to European analytic and dialectical conceptions that failed to bridge 
theory and praxis, as neither takes into account the Marxian continuum 
between social life and economic conditioning, particularly reified in 
alienated labor and false consciousness.
As I have shown elsewhere, the critique of late capitalism and 
the ongoing democratization of emerging societies and developing 
countries remain a complex process that has engaged diverse segments 
of civil society (DE OLIVEIRA, 2004). Now, I think that Dussel has 
correctly identified some of the difficulties inherent in the Habermasian 
systemic-lifeworldly paradoxes of modernity. I also believe that Dussel 
has convincingly refused to embrace a Foucauldian-like postmodernist 
demonization of social institutions. However, I am not convinced that his 
ethics of liberation has sufficiently explored some of the very problems 
that both Foucault and Habermas unveil in their respective attempts to 
account for the contradictions and paradoxes of modernity, in order to 
make a case for liberation in systemic and lifeworldly terms. For one, 
Dussel seems to avoid dealing with the normative and sociological 
deficits that Habermas and Honneth  have rightly spotted in the first-
generation accounts of critical theorists, namely, the very idea of a 
democratic ethos that is missing in most egalitarian accounts that tend 
to downplay individual freedoms and civil rights. On the other hand, 
both Foucault and Habermas have offered insights into the technological 
transformations that have revolutionized our geopolitical, juridical views 
of society, socialization, and power relations. Finally, both Foucault and 
Honneth have renewed a pragmatist approach to self-development 
and intersubjective accounts of alterity and recognition that allows for 
interesting rapprochements with psychology and ethnology.
I thus fully endorse Ofelia Schutte’s critical theory of liberation as 
she sets out to “understand the relationship between liberation, cultural 
identity, and Latin American social reality from the standpoint of a 
historically rooted critical philosophy” (SCHUTTE, 1993, p. 1). In effect, 
for Schutte the quest for cultural identity is precisely what brings about N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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a philosophy of liberation, whose ultimate goal is “to provide methods 
of critical analysis and models for practical action [... so as] to defend 
the cultural, political, and economic integrity of the people of the region” 
(SCHUTTE, 1993, p. 173f.). Furthermore, beyond the properly social, 
political dimensions of liberation Schutte argues for a view of liberation 
that “reaches also into the personal”, including thus “a psychological 
and existential component to the liberation process” (SCHUTTE, 2004, 
p. 184). Hence Schutte critiques Dussel’s totalizing, dualistic approach to 
the task of liberation (according to which the Other’s morally good alterity 
must overcome the absolute evil of the dominating Totality). Schutte ends 
up unmasking the supposedly radical thrust of its liberatory program, 
as it unveils a metaphysical, idealist, and essentialist conception of 
power, akin to Mariátegui’s economic determinism in his approach 
to “the problem of the Indian,” as the problem of race is not properly 
thematized in philosophical terms. Dussel seems to go a step further but 
remains somewhat hostage to the materialist Marxist analysis insofar 
as the oppression of the Amerindian belongs to a broader framework of 
systemic oppression.
Now, Dussel has of course revised his own position, following 
Schutte’s critical remarks, and as it was pointed out before, there have 
been substantial shifts within liberationist thought so as to include 
environmental, ethnic, race- and gender-related issues in their discussions 
on liberation. I firmly believe that, insofar as it remains bound to the fate 
of Latin American democratic institutions, the future of liberation must 
take the deconstructing path of a critical, social philosophy of race whose 
normative and empirical fields of interdisciplinary, intercultural research 
hinge upon the phenomenological correlation of a social ontology, 
an intersubjective theory of alterity, justice, and recognition, and a 
moral grammar of liberation. After all, a normative-democratic model of 
liberation is not necessarily opposed  to an agonistic one, insofar as it is 
to be accomplished not only by social movements from below (such as the 
landless workers and the liberationist ecclesial communities) let alone by 
governors, the elites or intellectuals, as it were, from above, but ultimately 
by civil society as a whole and its reflective commitments to solidarity 
and networks of social cooperation. It is in this sense that different social 
philosophers such as Foucault, Habermas, and Honneth can contribute to 
our own search of a new way of doing social phenomenology. It is thus 
by undertaking anew the radical hermeneutic turn inherent in Liberation 
Philosophy, by deconstructing liberation both in a pro-active, constituting 
and in a passive, historically-constituted sense, that a Phenomenology 
of Liberation seems to be in order in Latin America today. In effect, to a 
certain extent, one cannot speak of Latin American philosophy in the same N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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way that we usually refer to, say, French, British, German or American 
philosophy, as both the factual and modal claims that “there is or there 
could be a characteristically Latin American philosophy” remain under 
suspicion (NUCCETELLI, 2003, p. 524). As Gracia pointed out, it turns out 
that the phrase “’Latin American philosophy’ (filosofia latinoamericana) in 
Latin America is taken to be inferior, weak, and derivative, in comparison 
with ‘European’ or ‘American’ philosophy”(GRACIA, 2005, p. 415). And 
yet it seems reasonable to speak of Liberation Philosophy as one of the 
best and most original samples of Latin American philosophy – in the 
way, say, one might refer to Cartesian rationalism, British empiricism, 
German idealism or American pragmatism as established schools and 
trends in these countries. Therefore, the moral and political philosophy 
proposed and developed by several neo-Marxist and social thinkers 
in Latin America constitutes an important chapter in the formation 
of Latin American identity, hence the importance of taking race and 
ethnicity seriously. As we take into account Schutte’s perspectival and 
Gracia’s metaphysical approaches as non-essentialist takes on race and 
ethnicity, not only in Latin America but also in the US, we may as well 
move towards what would be a Pan-American conception of Hispanic or 
Latino identity, or a Latino pan-identity in the very quest of liberation. If 
a wide reflective equilibrium allows for such a pan-ethnic identity within 
different comprehensive views, say, of mixed-raced Native Americans, 
Amerindians, Afro-Latin, African-Americans, mulattoes, zambos and 
others, we come full circle in our own attempt to establish the correlation 
between ontology, subjectivity, and language. Since race and ethnicity do 
not have fixed contours, as they change over time with the very dynamics 
of cultural, demographic, and social transformations, we may speak of 
diasporic, hybrid conceptions of race and ethnicity that not only overlap 
on many occasions but also influence each other, even as they point 
to their paradoxical indeterminacy (BENHABIB, 2002, p. 194; GARCIA 
CANCLINI, 1995, p. 14). It is not so much a semantic problem or a realist 
predicament of sorts – whether biological or social kinds – that could be 
made reducible to ontological or linguistic commitments (ethnos, genos, 
nations, tribes, and peoples), as it is fundamentally a social problem that 
entails intersubjective thinking, normativity, and a critique of power. As a 
classical example we might evoke here the so-called three-race account 
found in the Hebrew Biblical story of the Sons of Noah (Shem, Ham, and 
Japheth), that was later appropriated by racist, ideological narratives 
such as Gobineau’s, along the lines of Foucault’s contention that the race 
war “is not a clash between two distinct races...[but] the splitting of a 
single race into a super-race and a sub-race” (Il faut défendre la société, 
in FOUCAULT, 1997, p. 61).N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
220  Veritas, v. 55, n. 1, jan./abr. 2010, p. 206-226
IV
Now, the phenomenological deficit of critical theory ultimately unveils 
communicative networks and lifeworldly practices that resist systemic 
domination, as we have learned from Foucault’s critique of power, 
especially in light of his recently published Cours au Collège de France on 
subjectivation and recasting Habermas’s and Honneth’s readings. Hence, 
this phenomenological deficit holds both for Honneth in the dynamics of 
recognition and for Habermas, in his recourse to communicative action. 
In order to settle ongoing struggles for liberation and recognition neither 
liberal nor socialist proposals for social peace (contractarian, procedural, 
communitarian, agonistic and others) seem to sufficiently account for the 
phenomenological tensions between identity and difference, sameness 
and otherness, the abstract and the concrete, the familiar and the alien, 
parts and whole (HONNETH, 1991). This is precisely what we have 
characterized as concrete tensions between private and public interests, 
material and ideological relations, theoretical and practical intents, 
in a word, what Honneth has characterized as “social pathologies,” 
following Marx’s highly original approach to the existing contradictions, 
shortcomings, and inequalities in the capitalist societies of his own times. 
(HONNETH, 1996) A phenomenology of liberation must thus carry out the 
radical hermeneutic, deconstructive thrust of its emancipatory project in 
the following programmatic terms:
1.  Insofar as it realizes and fulfills itself qua static, genetic and 
generative phenomenology, Husserl’s transcendental phenomeno- 
logy may be regarded as a proto-hermeneutics, paving the way to 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn.
2.  Only by means of a phenomenological hermeneutics can we 
rescue the fundamental sense of ontology, so as to avoid ontic 
and essentialist reductions, insofar as human modes of being 
(i.e., pertaining to Dasein as In-der-Welt-sein),  actions  and 
activities overall (praxis) cannot be reduced to a mere theoretical 
presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) or “poietical” readiness-to-hand 
(Zuhandenheit), like other beings in nature (stones and living 
beings) and fabricated (artifacts, artworks, and human-made 
things), so that our world-disclosing techniques and practices 
toward worldless and poor-in-world beings foster our own 
development and self-understanding, as we relate to ourselves 
and to our environment. Human environment is essentially social, 
historical, and cultural, hence a correlation of self-understanding 
and technique underlies the ongoing domination of nature and 
struggles for recognition as an interplay of the will to power.N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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3.  Deconstruction is a radical hermeneutics: since there is no such 
a thing as a transcendental signified we are always already 
situated in relation to the very moments of signification in our 
social reproduction through social representations, symbolic, 
cultural, and theoretical concepts and philosophemes (in Derrida’s 
Nietzschean terms, metaphoricity, différance).
4.  The main task of a Phenomenology of Liberation is to think the 
unthought-of in the very impossibility of justice (assuming that 
justice to come, justice à venir, is the quasi-Messianic motif of 
ongoing struggles for liberation) within the limits of the possible 
(power). The social utopian horizons of liberation cannot fulfill or 
exhaust democratic, egalitarian claims and struggles for mutual 
recognition, beyond self-deceptive mechanisms of social control 
and technologies of the self.
5.  By effecting a rapprochement between the procedural conceptions 
of a reflective equilibrium (J. Rawls) and the lifeworld (J. Habermas) 
we aim at a hermeneutics of normativity correlated to the facticity of 
a democratic ethos inherent in a pluralist, political culture, capable 
of integrating semantic and pragmatic aspects of a diversity 
of practices and codifications (modus vivendi) that subscribe 
to possible, actual, and imaginable overlapping consensuses, 
especially when dealing with universalizable questions of human 
rights and public policies.
6.  We can thus seek to revisit the conception of a postnational, 
democratic ethos, including its different versions of deliberative 
democracy (Rawls, Cohen, Fishkin, Habermas) so as to recast 
the (Habermasian) problem of juridification (Verrechtlichung), 
beyond its original pejorative, negative sense, associated with 
the economic, financial, and administrative reductionisms that 
one might find, say, in a neoliberal, corporate globalization qua 
technical, systemic colonization of the lifeworld. A phenomenology 
of liberation rehabilitates in formal-pragmatic terms a positive 
juridification insofar as it articulates a social ontology with 
intersubjective struggles for recognition and a grammar of 
liberation, beyond the reification of labor and productive relations 
(Habermas, Honneth).
7.  Following Foucault, Apel, and Habermas, the three paradigms of 
ontology, subjectivity, and language are said to be co-constitutive 
and interdependent, insofar as they account for the problem 
of the social reproduction of the modern, rationalized lifeworld 
through the differentiated models of a sociological descriptive 
phenomenology, of a hermeneutics of subjectivation, and of a N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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formal-pragmatic discourse theory. Just as a Kantian-inspired 
“transcendental semantics” accounts for the articulation of 
meaning (“Sinn und Bedeutung”, in Kant’s own terms) in the 
sensification (Versinnlichung) of concepts and ideas as they either 
refer us back to intuitions in their givenness (Gegebenheit) of sense 
or are said to be “realizable” (realisierbar) as an objective reality 
(since ideas and ideals refer, of course, to no sensible intuition), a 
phenomenological-pragmatic perspectivism recasts, by analogy, 
the  phenomenological,  hermeneutical  semantic  correlation 
(Bedeutungskorrelation) between ontology, subjectivity, and 
language without presupposing any transcendental signified, 
ontological dualism (or Zweiweltenthese), or binary relationship 
between subject and object, theory and praxis, oppressors and 
oppressed. And yet the very irreducibility of the hermeneutic 
circle, together with the incompleteness of its reductions inherent 
in such a systemic-lifeworldly correlation, seems to betray a 
quasi-transcendental, perspectival network of signifiers and 
language games. The modern phenomenon of juridification 
(Verrechtlichung) turns out to be a good example of this new 
version of the same problem of accounting for the normative 
grounds of a critical theory of society. Habermas’s wager is that his 
reconstructive communicative paradigm succeeds in overcoming 
the transcendental-empirical aporias through a “linguistically 
generated intersubjectivity” (HABERMAS, 1987, p. 297).
V
My ongoing research in social phenomenology has sought to articulate 
the normative and empirical claims inherent in a Latin American 
philosophy of liberation that takes racial discourse into account. As I 
pointed out, the myths of racial democracy play a decisive role in the 
formation of ethnic identity in Latin America and remain paramount 
for the consolidation of a truly egalitarian democracy. Gilberto Freyre’s 
1933 seminal book Casa-Grande e Senzala (ET: The Masters and the 
Slaves) has been hailed as the most representative work on Brazilian 
identity ever, opening up endless debates on collective self-esteem, self-
understanding, and race relations in Brazil, esp. racial mixture, the quasi-
romantic idealization of the mulatto (pardo, moreno), and the so-called 
myth of “racial democracy” – even though there is no occurrence of the 
term in this book. Beyond its immediate context of the contemporaneous 
discussion on regionalism versus universalism following the Modern 
Art Week in 1922, Freyre’s analyses contributed to new, comparative N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
  Veritas, v. 55, n. 1, jan./abr. 2010, p. 206-226  223
readings of slavery systems and racism in the Americas. One particular 
upshot of the racial democracy myth is the ideology of whitening and 
the concomitant practice of miscegenation or race mixture, described 
by many scholars as the primary pillar of white supremacy in Latin 
America, particularly in Brazil (TWINE, 1997, p. 87). According to Twine, 
the whitening ideology “was originally coined by the [Latin American] 
elite to reconcile theories of scientific racism with the reality of the 
predominantly nonwhite population of their country” toward the turn of 
the 19th century. Thus Afro-Latin American children are systematically 
disempowered as they learn not to talk about racism, regarded as a taboo 
subject for discussion with their parents and peers (TWINE, 1997, p. 153). 
It was such a perverse circle that racial democracy has been fueling for 
decades throughout generations and it was only recently, especially after 
the end of military dictatorships in Latin America, that middle-class and 
the average citizen began talking about these social pathologies. Most 
Latin American citizens have certainly been socialized into a racist, 
paternalist political culture, so full of contradictions and shortcomings 
when compared to the normative, regulative ideals of the democratic, 
egalitarian yardstick. And yet, this making of a political culture is only 
sustained to the extent that Latin Americans also produce and reproduce 
such a culture. The shift from a hypocritical racial democracy towards a 
truly pluralist democracy has in effect been the only way out of the elitist 
pseudoliberalism of both military and civilian calls to “modernize” Latin 
America. Just as the aestheticist regionalism and nationalism of the 
modernist movement of the 1920s gave way to a technocratic, nationalist 
modernization in the 1950s and 1960s only to highlight the oligarchic, 
hierarchical relations of power that made Brazil one of the most socially 
and economically unequal nations of the planet, a moral revolution 
from below alone can secure the rule of law for all and call for a public, 
democratic distribution of primary goods. If Brazil remains too far from a 
well ordered society and public participation in the bargain processes is 
still remote from vast, excluded segments of the population, the political 
thrust of social movements meets a fortiori the normative criteria of 
a concept of democracy that defies and transgresses any corrupted, 
systemic “power that be” for the sake of the people. The egalitarian 
premises in Affirmative Action procedures can do precisely that, whenever 
one has to be reminded that the outcast in Latin America discover their 
own identity as citizens, rights-bearers or as end-in-themselves only 
when they become visible in the public sphere and get talked about in 
the media. Hence a radical critique of racial relations, state, and society 
is not necessarily opposed to the normative ideals of a philosophy of 
liberation.N. de Oliveira – Towards a phenomenology of liberation
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In full agreement with Andrews, I believe that because race does 
matter in Latin America “black activists, aided by black and white 
scholars and intellectuals, lobbied intensively for the addition of racial 
data to recent Brazilian, Costa Rican, and Uruguayan censuses and 
are currently lobbying for their addition to censuses in Colombia and 
Panama”. National population census have been carried out in most Latin 
American countries every ten years, on a regular basis, since the 1980s 
and 1990s. In Brazil, the first census was taken in 1872 and the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics has been performing national 
censuses every 10 years since the 1930s –the next one will be carried out 
this year. It is very interesting the way public discussions about race and 
color have contributed to deconstructing the myth of racial democracy 
in that country and consolidating its social, democratic institutions, 
especially insofar as they unmask racial inequalities and subtle forms 
of racism. Affirmative action has come to the fore of ongoing debates 
opposing different camps across the complex spectrum of positions that 
denounce cultural browning, whitening ideologies and Europeanization. 
These social pathologies, crystallized in racist and racialized conceptions, 
betray the relevance and the inescapability of race in public discussions 
about inequalities in Latin America. The empirical findings of censuses, 
polls, and surveys point to this inevitable social construct and its key role 
in shaping democracy. As Andrews put it, “If race truly did not matter 
– if it did not play a powerful role in determining how much education 
one receives, what kind of job one works at, how much salary one earns, 
even how long one lives –we would not need these data” (ANDREWS, 
2004, p. 206 f.).
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